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Under what conditions do communities built around distributed agency create durable decision structures without concentrating informal power in unacknowledged gatekeepers?
Claim-level verified dossier separating formal participation, viable choice, external efficacy, agenda influence, responsiveness, loser consent, and reform credibility.
Political agency is multidimensional. Formal voting access, viable choice, nomination influence, agenda influence, policy responsiveness, procedural fairness, and perceived reformability can diverge. Evidence does not support a simple chain from constrained choice or distrust to anti-democratic or revolutionary attitudes.
Twelve analytical dimensions for studying distributed, adaptive, institutionally coupled collective processes.
Shows that perceived ideological incongruence is associated with lower satisfaction even when objective congruence is controlled. Included to prevent the dossier from treating perceived political agency as a transparent readout of institutional structure.
Evidence that primary electorates can influence nominee ideology and that candidates respond to different electoral constituencies. Supports treating nomination-stage influence as a distinct part of political agency without equating it with total elite control.
Argues that aggregate responsiveness measures can conceal unequal signaling power, agenda access, and policymaker response across groups. Used to make distributional inequality a first-order part of the agency model.
Distinguishes organization-heavy collective action from digitally mediated connective action in which personalized sharing can itself perform coordination. Useful for analyzing distributed scaling without assuming organization is absent.
